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This note presents a solution to Rubinstein (1982)’s open-ended, alternating-offer bargain-
ing problem for two equally patient bargainers that exhibit similar degrees of inequality
aversion. Inequality-averse bargainers may perceive envy if being worse off and guilt if be-
ing better off, but they still reach agreement in the first period under complete information.
If the perceived guilt is strong, then the inequality-averse bargainers split the bargaining
surplus equally regardless of their degree of envy. If guilt is weak, then the agreed split
is tilted away from the Rubinstein division towards a more unequal split. Envy and weak
guilt have opposite effects on the bargaining outcome, and envy has a greater marginal
impact than weak guilt. Similarly inequality-averse bargainers agree on the Rubinstein di-
vision if the strength of envy equals the discounted strength of guilt. As both bargainers
sensation of inequality aversion diminishes, the bargaining outcome converges to the Ru-
binstein division.
Keywords: alternating offers, bargaining, bargaining power, behavioral economics, envy, equity,
fairness, guilt, negotiation, social preferences
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1 Introduction
Some social preferences assume inequality aversion, a utility loss caused by receiving the
smaller or the larger share (Bolton & Ockenfels 2000; Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Kohler 2011; Tan
& Bolle 2006). Inequality aversion, and variations therein, can explain main features of exper-
imental behavior observed across different bargaining games and sociocultural contexts (e.g.,
Barr et al. 2009; Bellemare et al. 2008; De Bruyn & Bolton 2008; Goeree & Holt 2000; Kohler
2013b). However, theoretical and empirical work has focused on the study of inequality aver-
sion in finite horizon bargaining.
This note adds a small theoretical contribution to the existing literature by presenting a so-
lution to Rubinstein (1982)’s open-ended, alternating-offer bargaining problem for two equally
patient bargainers that exhibit similar degrees of inequality aversion. Since inequality aver-
sion diminishes the utility from unequal partitions, more equal divisions and disagreement,
in which case both bargainers receive nothing in the failed bargaining round, become more
attractive in Rubinstein (1982)’s bargaining problem. Thus, some previously incredible threats
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to reject uneven partitions become credible for inequality-averse bargainers whose decision-
making is affected by the fairness of their presently realizable outcome and the fairness of their
outside option, i.e., the payoff distribution realized in case of disagreement.
Envy and guilt, the two components of inequality aversions, influence the bargaining par-
tition in opposing directions, but allocations under which the disadvantaged party feels envy
do not occur throughout the bargaining if guilt is high. Hence, the relative strength of guilt in
comparison to bargaining parties’ self-interest impacts the bargaining outcome in two ways:
High guilt triggers an equal division because the bargainers’ utility decreases when receiving
more than half. Low guilt diminishes the marginal utility of income, but preserves its positive
marginal utility. Own low guilt, ceteris paribus, weakens the own bargaining position. Roth
(1985) showed a similar influence of risk aversion that also works to a bargainer’s disadvan-
tage within each bargaining period. Overall, the same degree of low guilt in both bargainers
helps the proposing bargainer to take a larger share than predicted by Rubinstein. The para-
dox as to why feeling guilty about a larger share can result in a more unequal division than the
bargaining of self-interested parties is driven by the weakened bargaining position of the dis-
advantaged bargainer. The disadvantaged bargainer compares accepting a share smaller than
half to proposing a share larger than half in the subsequent period, the utility of which is di-
minished by guilt. As low guilt maintains a positive marginal utility of income, the proposing
bargainer exploits the lowered value of the accepting bargainer’s outside option by increasing
his demand. Low guilt has the opposite effects of envy. Envy, ceteris paribus, reinforces the
bargaining position of a bargainer. If the two bargainers are only similarly envious, then the
bargaining outcome departs from the Rubinstein division converging toward an equal split. If
no bargainer is averse to inequality then bargaining proceeds as predicted by Rubinstein.
Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 introduces the alternating-offer bargaining
problem with inequality-averse bargainers. I derive the bargaining outcome in section 4. Sec-
tion 5 discusses the equilibrium outcome and concludes.
2 Related literature
Various research suggests that at least some people show regard for others, which includes as-
pects of envy (e.g., Camerer 2003; Herreiner & Puppe 2009; Smith 2008; Zwick et al. 1992). The
empirical evidence of guilt in addition to envy in bargaining experiments is mixed. Estimating
average inequality aversion as introduced by Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) in a structural model
of bounded rationality based on data from an ultimatum game field experiment in Zimbabwe,
Kohler (2013b) finds significant inequality aversion and self-interest in three different areas
studied. Overall, the data was better explained by a model of guilt and envy, i.e., symmetric in-
equality aversion, than by a model of envy, i.e., asymmetric inequality aversion (Kohler 2008).
Also De Bruyn & Bolton (2008) discuss that symmetric inequality aversion may statistically
improve the fit of different experimental bargaining data in a meta-analyses with the Bolton
& Ockenfels (2000) model of inequality aversion, but they preferred an asymmetric specifica-
tion of the model that only captures envy to predict bargaining behavior because, inter alia, it
provided better out-of-sample forecasts for their finite horizon bargaining games.
Alternating-offer bargaining between envious bargainers with player-specific preferences
has previously been studied in an infinite horizon game with complete information and in
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a finite horizon game with incomplete information (Kohler 2012b, 2013a). Infinite horizon
alternating-offer bargaining between similar, merely guilt-perceiving bargainers has been stud-
ied by Kohler (2012a). All three of these earlier studies assume versions of the Fehr & Schmidt
(1999) model of inequality aversion. So does the paper at hand, which considers similar bar-
gainers that can experience envy and guilt in the Rubinstein bargaining problem. I gener-
alizes Kohler (2012a) and my findings complement Mauleon & Vannetelbosch (2013), who,
like Kohler (2012b), study relative concerns and delay in alternating-offer bargaining with pri-
vate information. Assuming complete information and that both players had relative concerns
captured by a special case of Fehr & Schmidt (1999)’s model of inequality aversion, Mauleon
& Vannetelbosch derive that an increase of the first mover’s envy can decreases the second
mover’s equilibrium payoff and that an increase of the second mover’s guilt can increase the
payoff of the first mover if the difference in discounting is sufficient. Inequality aversion has
also been studied in bargaining games in which unanimity was not required. In line with the
present findings, Montero (2007) establishes that the equilibrium payoff division can be more
unequal despite inequality-averse bargaining parties.
The inequality aversion model studied consists of envy and guilt. Guilt shares some fea-
tures with altruism because a guilt perceiving person feels altruistic towards others until the
advantageous situation disappears (see, Kohler 2011). Altruism may be beneficial when there is
competition for bargaining partners. It may be detrimental if bargainers discriminate towards
whom they feel altruistic (Montero 2008).
3 Bargaining model
Two bargainers i, j ∈ {b, s}, called the seller and the buyer, have to reach an agreement on
the partition of a surplus of size one which depreciates after any disagreement. Bargaining
takes place at periods of time t = 1, 2, ..., T. Depreciation is modeled by assigning a common
discount factor δ = δb ≡ δs < 1 to the two bargainers. By naming a partition pt ∈ (0, 1] in odd
periods, the seller demands share pt and offers share (1− pt) that the buyer can either accept or
reject. In even periods, the buyer proposes a partition pt to the seller that he can either accept or
reject. If a partition is accepted, the game ends in period T. This bargaining outcome is denoted
(pT, T).
Assuming complete information in this bargaining problem, Rubinstein (1982) has shown
the existence of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) under generic preference assump-
tions.1 For preferences ui (xi) = xi, where utility is derived from one’s own payoff xi, Rubin-
stein derived an explicit solution in which the seller proposes and the buyer accepts partition
p∗ = 11+δ ∈ [0.5, 1) in period 1. The equilibrium outcome is supported by the bargainers’
similar strategies: Bargainer i always demands the equilibrium share p∗, when it is his turn
to make a proposal; otherwise accepts any share equal or greater than δp∗ and refuses any
smaller share. The demand of p∗ is the highest share that is accepted by the other bargainer j.
1(i) ‘pie’ is desirable, (ii) ‘time’ is valuable, (iii) continuity, (vi) stationarity, i.e., the preference of ( pˆ, t) over
( p˜, t + 1) is independent of t, and (v) the larger the portion, the more ‘compensation’ a player needs for a delay
of one period to be immaterial to him. Strategies are said to constitute a SPE if, in every subgame, the strategies
relating to that subgame form a Nash equilibrium. In a SPE, a bargainer will agree to a proposal if it offers at least
as much as he will obtain in the future given the strategies of both bargainers. Rubinstein (1982) states the precise
definitions.
3
Bargainer i cannot gain by asking for a lower share, for it too will be accepted. Stipulating a
higher (and rejected) share and waiting to accept bargainer j’s counteroffer in the next period
hurts bargainer i as δ (1− p∗) = δ2 p∗ < p∗.
This study builds on Rubinstein’s framework and investigates the strategic behavior of bar-
gainers who care, to some extent, about relative as well as absolute payoff in the bargaining
process described. Relative payoff hereby means bargainers compare their own benefit xi from
accepting a certain partition to the benefit of the other bargainer xj, and put common weight
α ≥ 0 on the difference whenever their own benefit is lower and common weight β ∈ [0, 1),
where α ≥ β, on the difference whenever their own benefit is higher. These relative concerns






= xi − αmax
{
xj − xi, 0
}− βmax {xi − xj, 0}
These preferences of inequality aversion were originally put forward in Fehr & Schmidt (1999)
and extended by altruism in Kohler (2011). Inequality aversion consistently predicts a rich
set of stylized experimental behavior (see, e.g., Cooper & Kagel n.d.; Fehr & Schmidt 1999).
The inequality aversion preferences violate some of Rubinstein’s preference assumptions, but
a unique bargaining outcome continues to exist if β 6= 0.5. Throughout, us(pt) := us(pt, 1− pt)
denotes the seller’s utility and ub(pt) := ub(1− pt, pt) the corresponding buyer’s utility if a
proposed partition pt is accepted in period t.
4 Subgame perfect equilibrium
Proposition 1. The alternating-offer bargaining problem with similarly inequality-averse and discount-
ing bargainers has a unique SPE if β 6= 0.5. If guilt is high, i.e., β ≥ 0.5, then the seller immediately
receives half of the surplus. If guilt is low, i.e., β < 0.5, then the seller immediately receives:
p∗ =
1+ α− βδ
1+ 2α+ δ(1− 2β)
The proof of proposition 1 is divided in two parts. For low guilt β < 0.5, the first part of the
proof is based on Shaked & Sutton (1984) who applied backwards induction in a truncation of
the infinite horizon game: The beginning of the infinite horizon game is equal to its subgame
in the third round, should it be reached. In odd periods, the seller is proposing and then the
bargainers alternate in making subsequent offers until an agreement is reached. For high guilt
β ≥ 0.5, the argument of second part of the proof is based on the negative marginal utility of
own income.
Proof. Suppose the above strategies induce a backwards induction outcome (p∗, 1) of the game
as a whole. It is possible to use the partition p∗ in the subgame, which starts in the third period,
assuming it was reached, and, then, to work back to the first period. In the backward induction
outcome of the whole game, the seller will propose p1 = pi (p3) in period 1 and the buyer
will accept. If pi is a monotone function, then the equilibrium partition is uniquely defined
by p∗ = pi(p∗). In order to determine pi, the periods in which inequality aversion influences
the bargainers’ decisions need to be identified. For now, assume the payoff distribution favors
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the proposing bargainer each time such that the proposer can always obtain at least half of the
surplus if β < 0.5, i.e., p1 ≥ 0.5, p2 ≤ 0.5, p3 ≥ 0.5. This assumption is shown to be valid after
deriving the equilibrium outcome.
The period 3 subgame begins with a successful proposal p3 ∈ [0.5, 1] by a guilt-perceiving
seller that feels envy if a disadvantageous partition p2 ≤ 0.5 was agreed. Consequently, the
lowest share p2 = (αs + δs(βs + p3(1− 2βs)))(1+ 2αs)−1 that is accepted by the seller in period
2 gives him the equivalent of his outside option, the discounted period 3 utility. Similarly,
the highest share p1 = ((1+ αb)− δb(1− βb − p2(1− 2βb)))(1+ 2αb)−1 that is accepted by the
buyer in period 1 gives him the equivalent of his outside option, the discounted period 2 utility.
Indifferent bargainers are assumed to accept the proposed partition. As ub(p2) ≥ δub(p3) and
us(p1) ≥ δus(p2), the buyer and seller prefer proposing the agreeable partitions that maximize
their utility to disagreement with the subsequent counteroffer.
Since the game in period 3 is identical to the game in period 1, the unique fixed point
p∗ := p1 (p3) ≡ p3 defines the equilibrium partition:
p∗ =
(1+ αb)(1+ 2αs)− δb(1+ αs) + δb(βb + βsδs(1− 2βb))
(1+ 2αb)(1+ 2αs)− δbδs(1− 2βb)(1− 2βs) =
1+ α− βδ
1+ 2α+ δ(1− 2β)
As only p2 and p1 maximize the utility of the bargainer proposing the partition, there is no
other SPE.
The advantage of the proposing bargainer on the equilibrium path requires p2 ≤ 0.5, im-
plied by the infimum of p∗ and the supremum of p2 (p∗): The partial derivatives of the equi-
librium partition p∗ with respect to envy ∂p∗/∂α < 0, guilt ∂p∗/∂β ≥ 0 and the discount factor
∂p∗/∂δ < 0 are negative, weakly positive and negative, respectively. Hence, the infimum of
p∗ is lim(α,β,δ)→(∞,0,1) p∗ which evaluates to 0.5. Similarly, as ∂p2/∂α > 0, ∂p2/∂β ≤ 0 and
∂p2/∂δ > 0, the supremum of p2 (p∗) is lim(α,β,δ)→(∞,0,1) p2 which also evaluates to 0.5. There-
fore, the assumed advantage of the proposing bargainer to receive half or more of the surplus
on the equilibrium path is true. The partial derivatives are derived in appendix 6.1.
If β > 0.5, then us(0.5) > us(0.5 + e). Thus, the equal division is weakly preferred to any
advantageous share by the seller in any period t. Further, as ub(0.5) < ub(0.5− e), the equal
division is preferred by the buyer receiving the disadvantageous share in period t. By the same
arguments the buyer also weakly prefers the equal division to any advantageous share and the
seller prefers redistribution of the surplus until its equal division is agreed. Thus, p∗ = 0.5 is the
only equilibrium partition. Indifferent bargainers for which β = 0.5 are assumed to choose the
equal division, but in this case the SPE is not unique. As bargainers discount it is immediately
asked and agreed.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Bargainers may incur inequality aversion, i.e., envy and guilt, in a bargaining process, which I
modeled as a loss of utility if receiving a smaller or a larger share of a surplus to be divided. In
open-ended alternating-offer bargaining between two parties with similar time and inequality
preferences, strongly guilt-perceiving bargainers gain utility from reducing an advantageous
situation until the inequality between the bargainers is eliminated. Therefore, in the presence
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of sufficient guilt, the unique bargaining outcome is the immediate acceptance of an equal
division.
In contrast, bilateral low guilt, ceteris paribus, can materially benefit the proposing bar-
gainer. If the bargaining parties perceive guilt only to such an extend that their utility remains
increasing in the own payoff despite increasing inequality, then the impact of guilt results in a
more unequal division than predicted by Rubinstein (1982) for purely self-interest bargainers
if α < δβ (see appendix 6.2). Envy, ceteris paribus, reinforces the bargaining position of each
bargainer, but only if guilt is low, because a non-credible threat of a non-envious bargainer to
reject unequal contracts may become credible in the case with envy. The bargaining outcome is
more equal than predicted by Rubinstein (1982) for purely self-interest bargainers if α > δβ.
For a low strength of guilt, the partial derivatives of the equilibrium partition imply that
the equilibrium partition is increasing in the common strength of guilt and decreasing in the
common discount factor and strength of envy. Envy has a stronger marginal impact on the
equilibrium partition than guilt. The bargainers’ individual envy, guilt and discounting have
opposite effects on the equilibrium partition. The share of each bargainer in-/decreases in
the strength of the own envy/guilt. Like in Rubinstein (1982)’s solution without inequality
aversion, agreement is immediate and the higher a common discount factor, the more equal
will be the agreed division. Taking the limits of the equilibrium partition for low guilt and
envy shows that the equilibrium partition is between the equal division and one (see appendix
6.1). Inequality aversion with low guilt diminishes the utility each bargainer derives from his
more equal bargaining outcome, even for the party that materially gains, in comparison to
the utility that purely self-interested bargainers derive from the Rubinstein division. Yet, the
second mover realizes a higher material payoff and utility level than a purely self-interested
bargainer if bargainers are inequality aversion with high guilt and, thus, equal partition instead
of the Rubinstein division is agreed (see appendix 6.3).
The condition α < δβ is ruled out by Fehr & Schmidt (1999)’s original model of inequal-
ity aversion that assumes β ≤ α, but this assumption may be relaxed to account for welfare
concerns that can interact with concern for inequality aversion (see, Engelmann 2012; Kohler
2011).
In general, the bargaining of symmetrically inequality-averse bargainers is not equivalent
to the bargaining of impatient purely self-interested bargainers, but the equilibrium partition
can coincide with the Rubinstein division if the opposing effects of envy and guilt on the
alternating-offer bargaining outcome just offset each other, i.e. α = δβ.
6 Appendix
6.1 Partial derivatives and limits for low guilt
If β < 0.5, the equilibrium partition p∗ and its partial derivatives are given by:
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p∗ =
(1+ αb) (1+ 2αs)− δb (1+ αs) + δb (βb + βsδs (1− 2βb))
(1+ 2αb) (1+ 2αs)− δbδs (1− 2βb) (1− 2βs) =
1+ α− βδ





= − (1+ α− β) ∗ D−2 < 0
∂p∗
∂δs
= δb (1− 2β) (1+ α− β) (1+ 2α− δb (1− 2β)) ∗ D−2 ≥ 0
∂p∗
∂δb
= − (1+ 2α) (1+ α− β) (1+ 2α− δs (1− 2β)) ∗ D−2 < 0
∂p∗
∂α
= − (1− δ) ∗ D−2 < 0
∂p∗
∂αs
= δ (1− δ) (1− 2βb) (1+ 2αb − δ (1− 2βs)) ∗ D−2 ≥ 0
∂p∗
∂αb
= − (1− δ) (1+ 2αs) (1+ 2αs − δ (1− 2βb)) ∗ D−2 < 0
∂p∗
∂β
= −δ δ− 1




= −δ2 (1− δ) (1− 2βb) (1+ 2αs − δ (1− 2βb)) ∗ D−2 ≤ 0
∂p∗
∂βb
= δ (1− δ) (1+ 2αs) (1+ 2αb − δ (1− 2βs)) ≥ 0
The respective signs follow from evaluating the derivatives. The limits of the equilibrium
partition p∗ are given by limδ→0 = 1+α1+2α ∈ [0.5, 1], limδ→1 = 0.5, limα→0 = 1−βδ1+δ(1−2β) ∈ (0.5, 1],
limα→∞ =
1+α−βδ
1+2α+δ(1−2β) = 0.5, limβ→0 =
1+α
1+2α+δ ∈ [0.5, 1] and limβ→0.5 = 1+α−0.5δ1+2α ∈ [0.5, 1]. The
limit values follow from evaluating the limits.
If β < 0.5, the partition p2 and its partial derivatives are given by:
p2 (p∗) =
α+ δ (1− β)





= (1+ α− β) ∗ D−2 > 0
∂p2
∂α
= (1− δ) ∗ D−2 > 0
∂p2
∂β
= −δ (1− δ) ∗ D−2 ≤ 0
The respective signs follow from evaluating the derivatives. The limits of the partition
p2 are given by limδ→1 = 0.5, limα→0 =
δ(1−β)
1+δ(1−2β) ∈ [0, 0.5), limα→∞ = α+δ(1−β)1+2α+δ(1−2β) = 0.5,
limβ→0 = α+δ1+2α+δ ∈ [0, 0.5] and limβ→0.5 = α+0.5δ1+2α+δ ∈ [0, 0.5]. The limit values follow from
evaluating the limits.
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6.2 Rubinstein division versus equilibrium partition with inequality aversion
If β < 0.5, then envy and guilt determine if and how the equilibrium partition with inequality
aversion deviates from the Rubinstein division:
1
1+ δ
Q 1+ α− βδ
1+ 2α+ δ (1− 2β)
α Q βδ
6.3 Utility in the subgame perfect equilibrium with inequality aversion
Irrespective of the strength of guilt, the utility of a guilt-perceiving seller, who perceives guilt












1+2α+δ(1−2β) ∈ [0.5, 1] if β < 0.5
1+δ
2 ∈ [0.5, 1) if β ≥ 0.5
The utility of a guilt-perceiving buyer, whose utility in equilibrium is unaffected by guilt, is not










1+2α+δ(1−2β) ∈ [0.5, 1] if β < 0.5
1+δ
2δ ∈ (1,∞] if β ≥ 0.5
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